The Sectarianization of Syria


Fighters from the FSA’s Southern Front: “Syria is for all – Druze, Kurds, Alawi, Assyrians, Sunni, Christians”

This article originally appeared in The New Arab. Here is the unedited version …

As the brief lull in Russian bombing comes to an end, Aleppo is entering its biggest and perhaps its last battle. For most people in the liberated east of the city this is a battle of survival against a genocidal regime, and a battle for democracy too, because in their hard-won liberty they have built democratic councils and a free media. Yet Aleppo often looks to the outside world like a battle between sects, and with good reason. A small proportion of the city’s defenders are Sunni Jihadists with previous links to al-Qaida. On the Assad regime side, up to 80% of fighters are foreign Shia Jihadists organised, trained and funded by Iran.

It didn’t have to be this way. 2011 marked a turning point in the collective consciousness of Syrian society. In a country divided by sect, ethnicity, region and class, a protest movement for freedom, dignity and social justice united people from a wide range of backgrounds. Suddenly the term ‘Syrian people’ gained a new, practical significance and became much more than a state-directed slogan.

Men and women took to the streets calling for the downfall of the four-decade dictatorship. As the ‘fear barrier’ famously broke, Syrians discovered themselves, each other and their country anew. Few, for instance, had previously heard of the small town of Kafranbel, in the rural north. But the witty banners activists in the town produced every Friday for its demonstrations brought it to national attention. Revolutionaries chanted in solidarity with towns resisting the regime’s brutal crackdown – ‘O Homs (or Dera’a, or Hama) we are with you until death.’ Slogans such as ‘One, One, One, the Syrian People are One’ called for unity and were against sectarianism. Groups such as ‘Nabd’ (‘Pulse’) were established to promote diversity and coexistence. Young Kurdish and Arab activists established the Kurdish-Arab Fraternity Coordination Committee which launched campaigns such as ‘Khorzi, I am your brother – Arabs and Kurds are one’. Well known Alawites (from the sect to which the president belongs) lent their support to the revolutionaries. One was the actress Fadwa Suleiman, who led protests in Sunni-majority Homs.

The first task of the counter-revolution, practising age old tactics of divide and rule, was to destroy this developing organic unity. One of the early methods the regime employed was the unequal distribution of violence in its response to the uprising. Areas which were wealthier or had a high proportion of minorities were treated more gently; teargas instead of bullets was used on protesters. The regime withdrew from Kurdish majority areas without a fight, handing over security installations to the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD). Working class Sunni-majority towns and suburbs, on the other hand, were barrel-bombed and gassed. This helped form cleavages between Arab and Kurdish revolutionaries, and between Sunnis and religious minorities.

The non-sectarian democracy movement was portrayed by the regime as an extremist Salafi-Jihadist plot from the outset, with the hope of frightening minorities into loyalty. This began with false flag operations, described in detail by Alawite writer Samar Yazbek in her wonderful book A Woman in the Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution. Regime thugs known as Shabiha instrumentalized sectarian hatred by carrying out violent acts in the coastal cities of Banyas, Jebleh and Lattakia, spreading rumours amongst each sect that the other was responsible. Then came a spate of sectarian massacres. The Syrian Network for Human Rights documented 56 sectarian massacres between March 2011 and June 2015. Of these 49 were carried out by regime forces (both local and foreign militias) and included sexual crimes, the burning of homes and the slaughter of entire families. According to the Network, no other group resorted to ethnic or sectarian massacres until June 2013. The purpose was to incite other groups to revenge. This worked.

The second target of these provocations was the international community. The regime couldn’t win support for a crackdown on peaceful protesters, but it could win support for a ‘War on Terror’. As the regime rounded up civil activists and protesters en-masse for indefinite detention and often death by torture, it released 1,500 Salafist prisoners in 2011. The beneficiaries of the amnesty included Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, who went on to lead al-Qaeda’s ex-affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, as well as Hassan Aboud, who led Ahrar Al Sham, and Zahran Alloush, who led Jaish Al Islam until his death by airstrike.

For many months after the arrival of Daesh (ISIS) on the scene, the regime in effect pursued an undeclared non-aggression pact with the group. Daesh is a great excuse for the continuation of the violence perpetrated by the regime and its supporters. Russia claimed its intervention was directed against the terror group, but over 80 percent of its bombs have fallen nowhere near Daesh-controlled areas. Iran tells its people that its presence in Syria is to defend them from Sunni jihadism. Yet most Iranian-backed forces are fighting rebel groups that are defending democratically organized communities, including Free Army militias. The presence of Iran’s Shia-jihadist militants greatly assists the Sunni-jihadist narrative.

When the town of Daraya, close to the capital, fell to the regime in August, its residents (both civilians and fighters) were cleansed and sent to rebel-controlled Idlib far to the north. Iraqi Shia families were then moved into vacant homes. Reports have also emerged from Homs and around the capital of Iran buying property and real estate after local inhabitants were forcibly expelled from their homes following heavy bombardment, massacres or starvation sieges in an attempt to change Syria’s demographics. In a speech in July 2015, Bashar Al Assad declared, “Syria is not for those who hold its passport or reside in it, Syria is for those who defend it”.

In a remarkable echo of this sentiment, Daesh leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi said: “Syria is not for Syrians and Iraq is not for Iraqis. The land is for the Muslims, all Muslims.” In areas controlled by Daesh, religious minorities have been driven out, murdered, forcibly converted or enslaved – even those Sunni Muslims who dare to dissent from Baghdadi’s perverse definition of Islam.

Some commentators hold that this process of ethnic-sectarian soft partition was an historical inevitability. Close attention to realities on the ground proves otherwise. In 2011 revolutionary Syrians expressed their desire for social unity, tolerance and diversity in order to achieve their dream of a free and democratic Syria. Many still do. It took the sustained violence of the forces of counter-revolution, backed by the full weight of foreign military intervention, to smash this possibility.


8 thoughts on “The Sectarianization of Syria

  1. Dear Leila,

    i would love to read your article, but the link to the english version is broken… Can you send a new one? Thank you!


    2016-10-31 16:03 GMT+01:00 Leila’s blog :

    > Leila Al Shami posted: ” This article originally appeared in The New Arab. > Here is the unedited version … As the brief lull in Russian bombing comes > to an end, Aleppo is entering its biggest and perhaps its last battle. For > most people in the liberated east of the city this ” >

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